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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court oral argument in Masterpiece Cakeshop
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission illustrated the
extraordinary difficulty that the case presents. The justices
debated whether Jack Phillips's denial of cake-creation services
for Charlie Craig and David Mullins's wedding reception was
constitutionally protected expression; 2 the implications for other
service providers if they decided that it was;3 how one could
determine whether his denial of service to the same-sex couple
constituted speech or the type of class-based discrimination
Colorado's public accommodations law condemned; 4 whether the
law was applied discriminatorily to burden religiously-motivated
refusals to serve;5 how narrowly, and with what effect on that
law, an accommodation for someone like Phillips could be
drawn;6 and whether it mattered if the couple could have
procured an adequate cake elsewhere and how one could make
that determination.7 At least on some views, these are all
difficult questions,8 many of which require delicate line-drawing.
How such line-drawing should come out and, indeed,
whether such analysis should even be necessary given the
expressive or non-expressive nature of Phillips's conduct,
present complex questions that cannot be fairly addressed in the
short space this Essay allows. Instead, this Essay focuses on one
facet of the case: the couple's (and the Civil Rights
Commission's)9 claim that application of Colorado's public
accommodations law to this case vindicates an important
1. 370 P.3rd 272, Colo. App., (2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) No.
16-111 (2017 term).
2. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd., et al. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm'n, et al., (2017) (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Oral Argument].
3. Id. at 11-16.
4. Id. at 17-19.
5. Id. at 52-56.
6. Id. at 25-30.
7. Id. at 28-30.
8. To be sure, some scholars believe that at least some of these questions are
not difficult. See, e.g., Steve Sanders, Even the Bernini of Buttercream Has to Serve
Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/02/
opinion/even-the-bernini-of-buttercream-has-to-serve-gay-couples.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/3NEA-52K5].
9. For ease of reference, arguments in favor of applying the Colorado law in
this case will be attributed to the couple or, when noted, to the amici who support
that result.
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interest in* the couple's dignity.10 Scholars of public
accommodations laws generally agree that, in addition to
ensuring that all Americans enjoy equal access to goods and
services in the marketplace, such laws also seek to vindicate the
dignitary interest in not being turned away at a place of
business.11
These interests, in addition to a more general anti-
discrimination goal, are at issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop.12 The
parties in this case, and their amici, devoted considerable space
in their briefs to the goals served by the Colorado law whose
application is at issue in that case.13 For their part, Phillips and
his amici stressed how accommodating Phillips's expressive and
religious preferences would not impair the gay couple's access to
the goods they desired." Phillips also questioned the strength of
the couple's dignity interest in light of the alleged majority
support for the couple's equality status. 15 He also asserted his
own dignity claim, based on the alleged compulsion of expression
in which he preferred not to engage, the alleged compulsion of
conduct that violated his religious beliefs, and, finally, the
stigma of being branded a violator of anti-discrimination laws. 16
Unsurprisingly, the couple and their amici took a different view,
in particular with regard to Phillips's claim about the
availability of alternative suppliers of the desired good.17 In
10. Brief for Colorado Civil Rights Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 1-2, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 137 S.
Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111) [hereinafter "Brief for Civil Rights Commission as Amici
Curiae"].
11. Id. at 27-31; see, e.g., Brief of Scholars of Public Accommodations Laws in
No. 16-111, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, at 27-31.
12. Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 73; Brief for Civil Rights Commission as
Amici Curiae, supra note 10, at 3-4.
13. Brief for Civil Rights Commission as Amici Curiae, supra note 10, at 26-31;
Brief for Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. at 52-56, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111) [hereinafter "Brief for
Masterpiece Cakeshop"].
14. Indeed, one of the baker's amici went so far as to include in its brief a map
of Denver showing the area's gay friendly bakeries that the plaintiffs could have
engaged to create their wedding cake. Brief for Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15-16, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111) [hereinafter "Brief for
Masterpiece Cakeshop as Amici Curiae"].
15. Brief for Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 13, at 54.
16. Id. at 52-55; see also Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 28 (United States
Solicitor General recognizing the couple's dignity claims but urging the Court also to
recognize Phillips's dignity claims).
17. Brief for Civil Rights Commission as Amici Curiae, supra note 10, at 33.
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addition to questioning the workability of a legal rule that
turned on such availability, they also argued that such claims
were beside the point, to the extent public accommodations laws
sought to vindicate more broadly-applicable dignity goals that
did not depend on the happenstance of how many gay-friendly
bakeries existed within a reasonable driving radius of the
couple's home.1 8
The centrality of dignity to Craig and Mullins's claim and
its importance as a justification for public accommodations laws
more generally raise puzzles. What does the concept of dignity
mean in the context of denials of service in public
accommodations? Can such an amorphous concept support legal
claims without additional claims of more material interests?
Does the law recognize such values in other contexts? In order
to consider these questions this Essay examines two disparate
sources: constitutional law and a canonical artifact of modern
popular culture: the "Soup Nazi" episode from the television
series Seinfeld. After Part II considers these questions from the
perspective of constitutional doctrine, Part III applies the
lessons it teaches to Masterpiece Cakeshop. Part IV illustrates
those lessons by considering the story of the Soup Nazi. Part V
offers a brief conclusion.
II. STIGMA, CASTE, AND DIGNITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
It is well-known that in recent years Justice Kennedy has
written individual rights opinions that emphasize the dignity to
which the plaintiffs have a constitutional entitlement.' 9 Thus,
one might think that the advocates defending application of the
Colorado public accommodations law in Masterpiece Cakeshop
are simply pitching their arguments to the perceived swing vote
in the case. Indeed, that is likely part of the answer. But this
argument assumes that the deprivation of dignity in and of itself
constitutes harm that both states a claim under the Constitution
and satisfies Article III's requirement that a plaintiff have a
judicially-cognizable injury. Justice Kennedy's most important
18. Id. at 33-35.
19. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (describing the dignity-
conferring status of marriage); U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (noting the dignity harm that follows from a criminal
conviction). Justice Kennedy has also employed this term when considering the
constitutional prerogatives of state governments in the federal system. See Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (noting the dignity states retain under our federal
system); Bond v. U.S., 564 U.S. 211 (2011).
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opinions focusing on individual dignity did not have to reach this
issue, since in those cases the challenged government action was
clearly imposing material harms on the plaintiffs. 20
According to the Court, such non-material injuries do cause
the requisite harm.21  Indeed, a concern with non-material
harms pervades the Supreme Court's race discrimination
jurisprudence, and has done so since the early years of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 22 In Strauder v. West Virginia, for
example, the Court struck down a state law excluding African-
Americans from jury service. 23 The Court reached this decision
based not only on the equal protection rights of the African-
American criminal defendant who was denied a trial by a cross-
section of the community, but also on the more general equal
protection rights of African-Americans to be free of what Justice
Strong described as "practically a brand upon them . . . an
assertion of their inferiority." 24 Strauder's recognition of such a
non-material component remained a fundamental part of the
Court's understanding of the equality the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed. 25 Even the Court's acceptance of Jim
Crow in Plessy v. Ferguson26 acknowledged that a law which
"stamps" a racial group "with a badge of inferiority" would
violate the Equal Protection Clause-it simply concluded that
the Louisiana train segregation law was not the source of any
such messaging. 27 Nearly sixty years later the Court, in Brown
20. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590-2601 (noting "the constellation of
benefits," some material, that accrue from the marital status that was denied the
plaintiffs); Windsor, 570 U.S. at 771 (noting that over one thousand federal statutes
allocate benefits and responsibilities depending on the person's status of being
married for purposes of federal law); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (noting the
"consequential" nature of the implications of a conviction under the challenged
sodomy law).
21. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590-2607.
22. Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303, 306-10 (1880).
23. Id. at 310-12.
24. Id. at 308.
25. Id. at 306-10.
26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27. Id. at 551 ("We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it."). Compare id. at 556-57 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("It was said in argument
that the statute of Louisiana does not discriminate against either race, but
prescribes a rule applicable alike to white and colored citizens. But this argument
does not meet the difficulty. Every one knows that the statute in question had its
origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars
2018] 119
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v. Board of Education,28 reached a different conclusion about the
message segregation sent.29 But Brown did not so much as
change the law of segregation as apply it differently-
presumably, far more accurately. 30
More recent cases, dealing with more modern racial equality
questions, reflect the same willingness to dispense with a
requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate a concrete harm from a
governmental race classification.3 1 These cases have reflected
that willingness both in terms of judging the ultimate merits of
the claim and determining whether the plaintiff had suffered an
injury that gave her standing to sue.32 Perhaps the clearest
examples of this phenomenon are the Voting Rights Act cases
involving white plaintiffs who challenged states' creation of
majority-minority electoral districts that state officials argued
were mandated by the Voting Rights Act. 33
Both sides in these cases acknowledged that the plaintiffs
suffered no obvious material harm from being placed in a
majority-minority district.34  Most importantly, those voters
retained the right to cast a non-diluted vote.3 5 Nevertheless, the
Court concluded in Shaw v. Reno that plaintiffs living in such a
district had stated a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection
Clause. 36  That opinion failed to discuss, or indeed, even
mention, standing.3 7 Instead, it focused on the harm to persons'
occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned
to white persons.").
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. Id. at 494 ("To separate [black schoolchildren] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone.").
30. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L. J.
421, 421-22 (1960). ('There is in [Plessy] no denial of the . . . Strauder principle [that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited 'legal discriminations, implying inferiority in
civil society']; the fault of Plessy is in the psychology and sociology of its minor
premise" that the Louisiana train segregation law did not imply the inferiority of
African-Americans).
31. U.S. v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-45 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
911-13 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993).
32. Hays, 515 U.S. at 738-39; Miller, 515 U.S. at 917.
33. Hays, 515 U.S. at 739-41; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 638-39. See also Miller, 515
U.S. 906-10.
34. Hays, 515 U.S. at 744-45; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 670.
35. Miller, 515 U.S. at 945 n. 11; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 638-641.
36. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642.
37. The state raised the standing issue, but only in a footnote. See State
Appellees' Brief in No. 92-357, Shaw v. Barr, 1993 WL 476425, at *10 n. 11.
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equal protection rights of being assigned to an electoral district
based on race. 38 According to the Shaw majority, such race-
based assignments "reinforce[] racial stereotypes" and
"threaten[] to undermine our system of representative
democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a
particular racial group rather than their constituency as a
whole." 39 Two years later, in Miller v. Johnson, the Court
explained that "[w]hen the State assigns voters on the basis of
race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that
voters of a particular race, because of their race, 'think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same
candidates at the polls."'40 On the same day it decided Miller,
the Court in United States v. Hays directly confronted the
standing question.4 1 In Hays the Court concluded that plaintiffs
who lived in districts other than the gerrymandered ones lacked
standing, since they were not subject to the "representational
harms" 4 2 the earlier cases had concluded were imposed on white
voters in the gerrymandered district.
The Court in these cases was forced to default to such vague
expressions of harm exactly because racial gerrymanders did not
cause a material harm such as the deprivation or the dilution of
the right to vote.43 The lack of such a material harm meant that
the harm-whether required for purposes of standing or the
merits of the plaintiffs equal protection claim-had to be
understood, as scholars have suggested, 44 in more expressive
terms. In particular, the Court understood the harm as the
message that race-based districting sent to politicians about the
intended or favored constituency in that district, and, perhaps
38. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649, 658.
39. Id. at 650. Two scholars commenting on Shaw concluded that that case
reflects the Court's concern with what they call "expressive harm," which they define
as a harm "that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a
governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material consequences
the action brings about." Richard H. Pides & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms,
Bizarre Districts, and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-07 (1993).
40. The Court also argued that racial gerrymanders "may cause society serious
harm" by encouraging the idea that the representative of a racially-gerrymandered
district represents only the voters of the race for which the district was created.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 912.
41. U.S. v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-47 (1995).
42. Id. at 745.
43. Miller, 515 U.S. at 930-31 (distinguishing between a "Shaw claim" and a
vote dilution claim); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 39, at 487.
44. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 39, at 508-14.
2018] 121
122 BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19.2
even more abstractly, the message it sent to the voters
themselves about the state's assumptions about their voting
behavior.45 It was only the existence of such messaging that
allowed the state to apply the strict scrutiny that by that time it
had decreed should apply anytime government used race as a
classifying tool.4 6
In other race cases the Court has been less willing to do
what it takes to subject seemingly obviously race-motivated
government decisions to the heightened scrutiny that generally
accompanies race-based government action. For example, in
Palmer v. Thompson,4 7 the Court ruled against black plaintiffs
challenging the City of Jackson, IVississippi's, decision to close
down its swimming pools rather than comply with a court order
to integrate them. 48 After observing, in effect, that the City was
not doing anything racially-based when it washed its hands of
all responsibility for operating municipal pools, 49 the Court then
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the City was violating the
Constitution by abandoning that function because of its
opposition to integrated swimming pools. 50 The Court pled the
impossibility of judges discerning invidious government
motivations,5 1 although, as scholars have noted, precedent
surely existed in 1971 for an opposite conclusion.52  That
rejection of basing a decision on governmental motivation
ultimately led to the Court's insistence that "the issue here is
whether black citizens in Jackson are being denied their
constitutional rights when the city has closed the public pools to
black and white alike." 5 3 So posed, the Court had no difficulty
concluding that the answer to that question was no. 5 4
Palmer was a five-to-four decision.5 5 Writing for three of
45. Id.
46. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (justifying the
use of strict scrutiny even when the racial classification was alleged to be benign);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying that rule to
federal, as well as to state, uses of race).
47. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
48. Id. at 219.
49. Id. at 218-19.
50. Id. at 223-24.
51. Id. at 224.
52. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 136-38 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1980) (critiquing Palmer's rejection of a judicial
inquiry into governmental motivations).
53. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 226.
54. Id.
55. See Palmer, 403 U.S. 217.
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those dissenters, Justice White was more willing to find a
constitutional violation in the motivation underlying the City's
decision to close its pools. 5 6 He wrote:
The fact is that closing the pools is an expression of
official policy that Negroes are unfit to associate with
whites. Closing pools to prevent interracial swimming
is little different from laws or customs forbidding
Negroes and whites from eating together or from co-
habiting or intermarrying. The Equal Protection
Clause is a hollow promise if it does not forbid such
official denigrations of the race the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to protect.5 7
For Justice White, then, the City's "expression of official
policy that Negroes are unfit to associate with whites" and its
"official denigration" of African-Americans constituted a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 8
Thus, a majority of the Court in the districting cases and
either three or four dissenters in Palmer were willing to accept
the idea that a non-material harm could suffice either to grant
standing to an equal protection plaintiff5 9 or constitute the sort
of harm that on the merits violated the Equal Protection Clause.
In that sense, the modern Court's understanding of the harm
caused by discrimination mirrors the understanding expressed
by the Court in Strauder and Plessy.60
In recent years, the Court has deployed these concepts of
stigma and implied inferiority in their reverse form-that is, in
56. Id. at 240 (White, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
57. Id. at 240-41 (White, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting)
(internal citations omitted).
58. See also id. ("I conclude that though a State may discontinue any of its
municipal services-such as schools, parks, pools, athletic fields, and the like-it
may not do so for the purpose of perpetuating or installing apartheid or because it
finds life in a multi-racial community difficult or unpleasant. If that is its reason,
then abolition of a designated public service becomes a device for perpetuating a
segregated way of life. That a State may not do.") Id. at 239 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
59. To be sure, the black plaintiffs in Palmer would have had standing because
of their loss of access to swimming pools. However, the effect of the majority decision
was that those plaintiffs were not the victim of an equal protection violation because
they were not (or the Court could not discern that they were) the victim of race-based
government action. Id. at 231-40 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 240-60 (White, J.,
joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
60. See Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1896); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896).
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support of an affirmative constitutional right to dignity. In the
gay rights cases since Romer v. Evans,6 1 the Court, in each case
speaking through Justice Kennedy, has insisted on the rights of
gays and lesbians not to be stigmatized or to be relegated to a
caste-like inferiority.62  In Romer, the anti-caste idea was
paramount, both in Justice Kennedy's conclusion that
Amendment 2 violated the Constitution by making gays and
lesbians literal strangers to Colorado law and in his explicit
invocation of Justice Harlan's insistence in Plessy that the
Fourteenth Amendment outlawed such caste legislation.63 In
the succeeding cases-Lawrence v. Texas, United States v.
Windsor, and Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice Kennedy shifted
focus, toward a positive insistence on the dignity of gays and
lesbians to make their own intimate choices (Lawrence)6 4 and to
claim the dignity-conferring status of marriage (Windsor and
Obergefell).65 To be sure, in all of these cases the challenged
laws imposed significant material harms on gays and lesbians. 66
But in all these cases the underlying constitutional entitlement
was to dignity-something that Texas's sodomy prohibition,
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), and state bans
on same-sex marriage denied to the gay and lesbian plaintiffs. 6 7
Craig and Mullins, the same-sex couple in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, have claimed a similar denial of dignity in Phillips's
refusal to provide them with a wedding cake. 68
III. DIGNITY IN MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP
What do the Court's statements about stigma, caste, and
61. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
62. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
63. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. "We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to
everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a
stranger to its laws." Id. at 623 ("One century ago, the first Justice Harlan
admonished this Court that the Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting
opinion)") (parallel citation omitted).
64. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
65. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594-96 (2015); U.S. v. Windsor, 570
U.S. 744, 768 (2013).
66. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593; Windsor, 570 U.S. at 744; Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 2475.
67. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599; Windsor, 570 U.S. at 744; Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 2478.
68. Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 28.
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dignity mean for Craig's and Mullins's claim in Masterpiece
Cakeshop that Phillips's denial of their service request impaired
their dignity? In his brief to the Court, Phillips cast his decision
not in terms of identity discrimination, but instead in terms of
his speech and religion rights: "[Phillips] will create his custom
art for everyone, including LGBT patrons, but he declines all
requests (regardless of the requester's identity) to create custom
artistic expression that conflicts with his faith."69 His brief's
discussion of the dignity interests asserted by the state on behalf
of the couple disclaimed animosity toward any particular group
of persons, asserted that the same-sex couple's underlying
ideology reflected majoritarian views, and expressed confidence
that persons in the couple's position could easily access the
desired services. 70 It also insisted on acknowledging the baker's
own dignity interests-in this case, his interest in not having his
religious beliefs "brand[ed] as discriminatory," in not being
"compel[1ed] ... to stop creating his cake designs," and in not
being "ostracize[d] . . . as a member of the community"-all of
which, he noted, were government-imposed burdens, as
compared with the dignity harms raised by the couple.7 1 These
claims implicate several facets of the dignity idea, and merit
serious consideration in light of the picture of dignity painted by
the Court's jurisprudence.
In his brief Phillips insisted that he harbored no "animosity"
toward gays and lesbians, and indeed, stated that he would not
discriminate against them in the sale of any item he would
otherwise sell-presumably, any item that either contained no
expressive element or reflected expression with which he was
comfortable.72 This first argument raises the question whether
dignity denials can arise from actions that are not maliciously
motivated (however one defines "malicious").
Presumably this argument can only succeed if something
about the non-governmental nature of Phillip's conduct
distinguishes it from government-imposed stigma. In Obergefell
v. Hodges, Justice Kennedy went out of his way to avoid
69. Brief for Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 13, at 52; see also Brief for
Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 13, at 41("Phillips's concern is about the integrity
of his own expression-not the inquiring individual's protected status.").
70. Id. at 53-55.
71. Id. at 55. He also argued that the Civil Rights Commission's attempt to
protect the couple's dignity interests were severely under-inclusive, and that less
intrusive alternatives would safeguard either all or most of those interests. See id.
at 56-61.
72. Id. at 53.
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criticizing the views of those who opposed same-sex marriage on
moral or religious grounds, but he nevertheless concluded that
such views could not be written into government policy if doing
so impaired the dignity interests of same-sex couples who wished
to wed.7 3 Bad intent-whether constructed or explicit-may
matter if the question is the constitutionality of discrimination
shorn of any claim of dignity denial. 74 But Obergefell means
that, at least in the realm of government action, it is
unacceptable to instantiate deprivations of dignity into public
policy, even when the deprivation is not grounded in animus.7 5
Does the private nature of Phillips's conduct change that
result, rendering dignity deprivations non-judicially cognizable if
imposed without bad intent? This question implicates broad and
difficult questions about the reach of anti-discrimination
principles intended to promote dignity, and, relatedly, the force
of any countervailing personal autonomy rights that might
shelter private discrimination. 76  Phillips's brief implicitly
acknowledges the public/private distinction77 when he insists
that application of the public acommodations law in this
situation impairs his own dignity by "brand[ing]" his "core
religious beliefs . . . as discriminatory," "compel[ing] him to stop
creating his cake designs," and "ostracize[ing him] as a member
of the community." 78 Indeed, he further notes that, unlike any
73. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
74. See generally City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 527
(1989) (explaining that strict scrutiny was necessary in order to "smoke out" any
"invidious" uses of race); WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO
BIAS IN THE LAW (NYU Press 2017) (offering an understanding of the Supreme
Court's "animus" doctrine that relies heavily on the Court's discriminatory intent
jurisprudence).
75. This conclusion is reinforced by scholars' observations that the dignity
Justice Kennedy spoke of in Obergefell sounded, at least in large part, in claims of
substantive right rather than equal protection simpliciter. See, e.g., Laurence H.
Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 17 (2015-2016).
("I argue that Obergefell's chief jurisprudential achievement is to have tightly wound
the double helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity
. . . . Equal dignity ... lays the groundwork for an ongoing constitutional dialogue
about fundamental rights and the meaning of equality.").
76. See generally, ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAw AND SOcIAL
EQUALITY (Yale U.P. 1996) (examining whether and the extent to which American
society's commitment to equality should entail regulation of private discriminatory
choices); James Oleske, Doric Columns are Not Falling: Wedding Cakes, the
Ministerial Exception, and the Public-Private Distinction, 75 MD. L. REV. 142 (2015)
(considering the same question through the lens of the distinction between public
and private spheres in American law and society).
77. See Oleske, supra note 76.
78. Brief for Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 13, at 55.
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dignity impairment suffered by the couple, the alleged
impairment of his own dignity is being perpetrated by
government action rather than private choices.79  These
arguments reveal the structure of the situation in Masterpiece
Cakeshop: rather than presenting the asymmetrical structure of
government action allegedly impairing the dignity interests of a
regulated party (the situation facing the Court, for example, in
Obergefell), Masterpiece Cakeshop presents a symmetrical
structure featuring two incompatible private dignity claims,
with government (in the form of Colorado's public
accommodations law) coming down on one side of the conflict to
the detriment of the other side's claim.
That structure, and Phillips's argument illustrating it,
requires us to consider whether dignity interests can be
impaired by private conduct as much as by government. This
does not seem to present a difficult question. To be sure,
Fourteenth Amendment cases involve government action alleged
to impair a person's dignity interests.8 0 However, the wide
acceptance of the principle underlying public accommodations
laws-that such dignity interests can also be impaired by
private action-seems to settle the matter, at least as a matter
of principle, bracketing for now any difficult issues that might
arise when countervailing private interests are brought into the
mIx.
Seen in this light, one can lament the fact that the public
accommodations provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act were not
primarily defended, or upheld, as legislation enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment. 81  Such a conclusion would have
solidified the concept that the right to freedom from dignity
impairments imposed at the hands of private actors was a
principle of constitutional dimension (or at least could be
legitimately so viewed by Congress). Nevertheless, the Court's
easy rejection of constitutional individual rights attacks on such
laws strongly suggests that those laws furthered important
public interests beyond constituting reasonable applications of
79. Id. at 44-45.
80. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
81. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (acknowledging
Congress's decision to base that part of the statute partially on its power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment but declining to consider that possibility); see also
Christopher Schmidt, The Sit-Ins and the State Action Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 767, 802-23 (2010) (discussing the political branches' and the justices'
deliberations on Congress's potential influence over the Fourteenth Amendment's
state action requirement).
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Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. 82
Indeed, the institutions responsible for enacting and
upholding those laws explicitly recognized that those interests
included dignity.8 3 As Elizabeth Sepper notes, the Congress
considering the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly identified the
protection of dignity interests as an important goal of the
statute's public accommodations provisions, 84 as did the Court's
decision upholding those provisions.8 5 In light of this history, it
is difficult to see how, as a matter of principle, the private
nature of the dignity invasion renders that harm non-cognizable.
But perhaps then the idea is that such interests, while
worthwhile as a general matter, do not outweigh countervailing
private interests-including a countervailing interest in the
dignity of the alleged discriminator. 86 It is in this light that we
can understand Phillips's argument that the couple's dignity
claims should be defeated in light of their alleged relatively
trivial status as compared to Phillips's own dignity claims.8 7
Begin with Phillips's countervailing dignity claim. His brief
refers to his dignity interests in terms of both social opprobrium
and ostracism (his religious beliefs being "brand[ed] as
discriminatory," and being "ostracize[d] . . . as a member of the
community") and limits on his constitutionally-protected
expression (being "compelpled] . . . to stop creating his cake
designs").88 This first set of interests constitutes a remarkably
weak foundation for a dignitary interest claim that might
outweigh the couple's dignitary interest in full access to the
marketplace-an interest that, as noted earlier, has been
recognized by Congress (indeed, recognized as having
constitutional stature) and whose importance has been
acknowledged by the Court. 89
To be sure, such arguments are not trivial in the larger
82. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258-60 (rejecting due process attacks on
the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
83. Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in the Moralized Marketplace, 7 ALA. J.C.R. & C.L.L.
REV. 129, 154 (2015).
84. Id. at 153-54.
85. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250; Sepper, supra note 83, at 154.
86. Brief for Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 13, at 55. ("The Commission
seems to think that it will eliminate dignitary harms through this and similar
applications of [the state public accommodations law], but that ignores the dignitary
interests on Phillips's side of the case.").
87. Id. at 50.
88. Id. at 55.
89. Id. at 50; Sepper, supra note 83, at 153-54.
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scheme of questions about the wisdom of public accommodations
laws and their breadth. Theorists thinking about this issue have
struggled over the liberal state's power essentially to take sides
in the struggle between such conflicting private interests.90
More generally, scholars have strenuously argued that tarring
one side of a political debate with opprobrious language or
labels-in the case of these scholars, the label of "animus," and
in Phillips's brief, having one's religious beliefs being "brand[ed]
as discriminatory" 91-corrodes the good will and trust that
makes possible political and social compromises on contested
matters of public policy and morality. 92
Nevertheless, these concerns should not carry the day for
Phillips. Whatever one might think as a matter of liberal
theory, it is well-accepted today that government can in fact take
sides when individual rights conflict. Phillips's more focused
argument-that it impairs his dignity interests to have his
religious beliefs "brand[ed] as discriminatory" and to be
"ostracize[d] ... from the community"-effectively amounts to an
argument that being labelled guilty of violating a public
accommodations law itself constitutes a sufficient impairment of
one's dignity to justify not applying the law in that case. 93 Such
a label may well sting-as, for example, it may sting to be held
to have engaged in intentional discrimination. 94 But by itself
that surely cannot suffice to warrant an exemption from the law
in that case, unless there is something so trivial about the
couple's dignitary interests that such a "brand" and such
"ostracism" constitute arbitrary deprivations of his liberty
interest in his reputation. 95
Perhaps, then, the dignity impairment flows from the
alleged impact the application of this law will have on the
baker's speech-recall that in his catalog of dignity concerns
90. See generally Koppelman, supra note 76.
91. Brief for Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 13, at 55.
92. Brief for Steven Calabresi et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Herbert v. Kitchen, 571 U.S. 1116 (2014) (No. 14-124) (urging the Supreme Court to
grant cert. in a same-sex marriage case in order to reject an animus-based rationale
for striking down bans on same-sex marriage); see Steven Smith, The Jurisprudence
of Denigration, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 675, 683-85 (2014) (making this argument).
93. Brief for Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 13, at 55.
94. Koppelman, supra note 76, at 63 ("Stigma is often, and appropriately,
inflicted by the law itself-most pertinently, by a legal finding that a defendant has
engaged in purposeful discrimination.").
95. But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 734 (1976) (holding that an individual's
reputational interest, by itself, does not constitute a liberty or property interest
protected by the Due Process Clause).
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Phillips included being "compel[1ed] . . . to stop creating his cake
designs."9 6 This threat to dignity is not trivial. If being denied
the right to speak impairs an individual's autonomy by removing
her agency in making the type of decision that in many ways
most marks us as human-the decision to express oneself9 7-
then presumably being compelled to speak has the same
deleterious effect on one's dignity. 9 8 But this claim, like his
claim that application of the law to him violates his rights to free
religious exercise, is accounted for by his First Amendment
arguments, which this Essay does not consider.
Phillips's remaining dignity claim turns on the relative
social positions of his claim as compared with that of the
couple's.9 9 Phillips's statement on this point raises the relevant
issues: the couple's point of view is the majoritarian one (or so he
alleges), the couple would find few obstacles getting its material
needs met in the marketplace, and his (Phillips's) dignity
interest is impaired by the government, as compared with the
couple's which, if it exists at all, is being impaired by Phillips's
private choices.1 00 The picture these allegations paint is one in
which the government puts its thumb on the scale on the side of
the majority-favored dignitary interest, to the detriment of a
dissenting/minority-based interest, in a context in which the
material harm to the majoritarian interest is alleged to be
minimal.
Again, though, as with broader claims about government's
lack of authority to choose between conflicting private interests,
such allegations prove too much. By 1964, disfavoring
segregation in public accommodations was a majoritarian
position,1 0 1 in many areas of the nation African-Americans had
at least some ability to access goods and services (even if doing
96. Brief for Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 13, at 55.
97. See Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUm. L. REV.
1255, 1259-60 (2014) (setting forth the autonomy theory of free speech).
98. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.").
99. Brief for Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 13, at 52.
100. Id. at 50.
101. Andrew Kohut, 50 years Ago: Mixed Views About Civil Rights but Support
for Selma Demonstrators, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org
/fact-tank/2015/03/05/50-years-ago-mixed-views-about-civil-rights-but-support-for-
selma-demonstrators/ [https://perma.cc/JA4A-NQDD] (noting that in October 1964
polling showed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 being favored by a 58% to 31% margin).
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so required searching, or at least the assistance of guides such as
The Green Book),10 2, and, of course, by that date the power and
prestige of the federal government had been placed decisively on
the side of non-discrimination rather than private autonomy to
discriminate. None of this is intended to minimize the
difficulties African-Americans faced in 1964, and continued to
face for years thereafter, in ensuring equal access to public
accommodations. But it does cast doubt on Phillips's claim that
the Craig and Mullins's dignity interests should give way in
light of the majoritarian and governmental support enjoyed by
the non-discrimination imperative as well as the relative ease
with which the protected group could locate goods and services.
IV. No CAKE FOR YOU
One way to illustrate the issues in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
and in particular to consider the dignity claims the litigants
raised and that this Essay discussed earlier, is to examine a
well-known popular culture reference to a situation that echoes
(perhaps only very distantly) the one in that case. In Season Six
of the 1990s situation comedy Seinfeld, the recurring characters
become aware of a soup shop that sells excellent soup. 103 The
only problem is that the proprietor-who the characters call "the
Soup Nazi"-insists on a rigid code of conduct within his shop.10 4
One mistake-requesting the same free bread other customers
received (George), tapping one's fingers on the counter and
making unwelcome small talk (Elaine), or (evocatively in light of
the basis for the discrimination in Masterpiece Cakeshop)
engaging in affectionate conduct with an intimate partner
(Jerry)-and the Soup Nazi exiles the hapless would-be diner
with the epithet "No soup for you!"10 5
The parallels between this situation and Masterpiece
Cakeshop are obvious enough; 106 as, it should be immediately
102. Meaghan Monahan, The Green Book: Safely Navigating Jim Crow America,
20 GREEN BAG 2D 43 (2016).
103. WIKIPEDIA, The Soup Nazi, https://en.wikipedia.org/wikilTheSoup-Nazi
[https://perma.cc/2RM7-8WS9] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018) (explaining the plot of the
episode).
104. Id.
105. Id.; Brett Cohen, The Best of The Soup Nazi, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v-M2ffg-apSA (last visited Feb. 9, 2018) at 1:15-1:52 (interaction with
Elaine), 1:52-2-26 (affectionate conduct between Jerry and his girlfriend).
106. One parallel that is not immediately obvious is that one of the characters
(Jerry) refrains from affectionate behavior with his girlfriend while in the shop, in
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noted, are the differences. But it's illuminating to think about
the motivations of the characters affected by either their actual
or threatened exclusion from the public accommodation of the
soup shop. Why do the characters care about their exclusion?
It's not enough to give the obvious answer-that they have to
care because otherwise there wouldn't exist the conflict that
creates the comedy. Of course, the characters have to care in
order to create the comedy. But why does their anxiety about
being denied service resonate with viewers in a way that creates
comedy? In other words, what is it about that exclusion that
makes their anxiety about it relatable-so relatable, in fact, that
the episode is now considered a classic, and the term "soup Nazi"
has now become an all-purpose term for an overly-rigid
dispenser of some product (with "soup" replaced by the
particular product in question)?10 7
Begin with the most obvious answer: the characters care
about their exclusion from the shop because the soup is so good.
Indeed, the episode is built on this foundation: the reason the
characters flock to the shop is because of the quality of the soup.
Nevertheless, their exclusion from the shop triggers other
motivations. Elaine's response is particularly noteworthy. She
is incredulous at having been banned, and, after gaining
leverage against him by accidentally obtaining his recipes, she
returns, eager to avenge her humiliation.108
Why did Elaine come back? To get soup? No, in fact she
explicitly (and triumphantly) tells the proprietor that that's not
the reason she's returned. 109 Instead, her goal is to ruin him,
and to make clear that it's she who's doing it, by ostentatiously
reading out loud, in his presence, from the soup recipes she has
come to possess. 110 Thus, what is motivating Elaine is not a
simple desire to obtain soup-or even in particular the excellent
soup offered by the proprietor.1 11 Instead, her goal is to assuage
the damage to her ego by inflicting a grievous injury, not just or
order to avoid what he fears will be the proprietor's negative reaction. The Soup
Nazi, supra note 103. It should also be noted that Elaine's first reaction to her
experience of the proprietor's conduct is to complain that it must be discriminatory.
See Seinfeld: The Soup Nazi (NBC television broadcast Nov. 2, 1995).
107. See, e.g., The Whistler's Wood Shop, The Candy Nazi, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-LJB2a-GZcsQ (last visited Feb. 9, 2018)_(comical
appropriation of the Soup Nazi story using a candy distributor at Halloween).
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even primarily on the proprietor's business, 112 but by making it
clear that he no longer has power over her. 113
But Elaine is merely the conduit by which all the
characters' dignity injuries are assuaged. Other than Kramer,
who served as the initial connection between the group and the
soup shop, all three main characters experience humiliation at
being refused service. 114 George suffers the indignity of not
being served. Indeed, the episode graphically illustrates,
through physical comedy, the indignity he suffers of having his
soup snatched back and his money roughly handed back to
him. 115 When he returns he is forced to grovel, rigidly following
the ordering protocol and sycophantically thanking him for
receiving what, by rights, he was due for his money (and even
then having to endure a warning from the proprietor). 116 Jerry,
when criticized by the proprietor for his public display of
affection inside the shop, was put to the Saint Peter-like choice
of denying his beloved or losing access to the material benefit
promised by the authority figure-choosing, through language
deeply resonant of Saint Peter, to renounce his human
affections. 117 Finally, the wound Elaine feels to her ego is so
deep-and is presumably understood by viewers as such-that
her avenging of that injury becomes the dramatic highlight of
the episode.
These dynamics are funny, but they're funny because they
illustrate the pain and insult people feel when they believe
themselves to have been humiliated. They're also funny because
the characters' reactions-ranging from George's defeated,
sycophantic compliance to Jerry's abandonment of his beloved to
Elaine's defiant return once she obtains game-winning
leverage-are those that are well-understood when humans are
confronted with this sort of humiliation threat: abase yourself
112. Even though she succeeds in running him out of the country (at the end of
the episode it is revealed that he is closing the business and returning to Argentina),
Elaine discloses no plans to open a soup shop of her own, and very quickly rejects the
option of ruining him by publicly disseminating the recipes. Instead, she chooses to
use her leverage more directly, by confronting him face to face. Id.




117. Id. (Jerry, to his girlfriend when she returns to the shop after he fails to
follow her out when she leaves in protest: "Do I know you?"). Compare with Matthew
26:71-72 ("71 When [Peter] went out to the gateway another servant-girl saw him
and said to the people there, 'This man was with Jesus the Nazarene.' 72 And again,
with an oath, he denied it, 'I do not know the man'.").
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and comply, thus abandoning your principles (respectively,
George and Jerry), or, alternatively, resist (Elaine). As such,
they illustrate the harm of such proprietors' refusal to serve. To
paraphrase the Senate Commerce Committee's report on the
Civil Rights Act of 1964: "Discrimination is not simply
Mulligatawny, turkey chili, and Jambalaya; it is the
humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that a person must
surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member
of the public."1 18  Note that no character responds to the
proprietor's exclusion by finding soup somewhere else. That
would not be funny, because it would be anti-climactic. And it
would be anti-climactic because it would not resolve the
fundamental tension driving the episode.
To repeat, the dramatic driver of the episode is the
excellence of the soup the "soup Nazi" offers; as noted earlier, the
episode would not make any sense, and thus would not be funny,
if his soup was nothing special. But this inescapable fact does
not prove the argument, made by Phillips and some of his amici
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, that the availability of similar goods
removes any meaningful harm from his denial of service.
Indeed, if that was the only harm at issue from the Soup Nazi's
conduct, then the episode would have ended differently: perhaps
with Elaine opening up a rival soup shop, printing out the
recipes and handing them out to customers waiting in line, or
perhaps simply cooking up a pot of Mulligatawny herself for her
and her friends. Or perhaps one of the characters would have
found another shop with soup that was just as good. But instead
Elaine needs to confront the proprietor. Again, the dramatics of
the episode require that final confrontation; we all would have
felt let down if she simply started procuring the same excellent
soup in some other way. But the dramatics require that
confrontation because only that confrontation assuages what we
know instinctively to be the harm Elaine suffers: the harm of
being a willing customer, ready to pay the posted rate for the
good in question, only to be told, "No soup for you!"119
118. Compare Sepper, supra note 83, at 153-154 ("Discrimination is not simply
dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, fruscration, and
embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he is told that he is
unacceptable as a member of the public.") (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 291-92 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (internal
quotations omitted).
119. See Seinfeld: The Soup Nazi (NBC television broadcast Nov. 2, 1995).
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V. CONCLUSION
Masterpiece Cakeshop raises several very difficult questions.
What constitutes constitutionally-protected expression? What
constitutes discrimination against religiously-motivated conduct
in the application of a facially-neutral law? Perhaps most
troublingly, how should the balance be struck between interests
in free expression and religiously-motivated conduct on the one
hand, and non-discriminatory access to the marketplace, on the
other?
One issue that is not difficult, however, is the existence of
dignity interests in such non-discriminatory access. This
interest exists even when a good or service would be otherwise
available in the marketplace. As Part I noted, the Court's
constitutional law jurisprudence makes clear that such non-
material harms are properly cognizable by courts, whether
expressed as a matter of substantive law or as a matter of the
harm a plaintiff needs to demonstrate in order to establish
standing to sue. As Part II discussed, Phillips's own arguments
on this point reveal the weakness of any argument to the
contrary and the similar weakness of any claims of his own
dignitary interest except, possibly, those that are wrapped up in
his speech and religion rights arguments the existence and
weighing of which this Essay has bracketed. Finally, Part III
illustrates the cultural understanding of the non-material,
stigma-creating harm that, among other harms, accompanies
discriminatory refusals to serve.
In the context of a challenging case like Masterpiece
Cakeshop, one should be thankful for even such limited clarity.
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